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Abstract. - In the lead-up to the 2013 parliamentary election, four 
Italian parties used primaries to select candidates. Primaries, which were 
autonomously decided upon by the parties’ central offices, have operated 
according to different rules. These quasi-experimental circumstances allow 
an assessment of the effects of rules and selectors’ predispositions in the 
promotion of legislator renewal. An examination of three aspects of 
renewal-gender balance, rejuvenation and turnover-found that party 
leaderships sometimes deliberately pursued renewal through biased rules. 
The cases in point are Partito Democratico and Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà 
regarding gender balance, and Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) regarding 
turnover. Moreover, even when unconstrained by the rules, selectors have 
pushed for renewal, as shown by the rise in female representation in the 
M5S. In general, primary elections have demonstrated to be renewal-
friendly. However, it remains unclear whether this is an idiosyncratic effect 
connected to a single election, or a general tendency due to the 
characteristics of primary voters. 
Keywords: Italy; parliamentary elections; primary elections; 
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1. Introduction
The general election held in February 2013 has been called out as a shock to the 
Italian political system. As in 1994, when Silvio Berlusconi and Forza Italia 
(FI) entered parliament, the Movimento 5 Stelle’s (M5S) electoral results were 
unforeseen (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; D’Alimonte 2013). The party led 
by Beppe Grillo won nearly one quarter of the total votes and reshaped the 
Italian political scene (Newell 2014; Pasquino 2014): bipolarism faded away; 
left and right became obsolete categories; new policy issues entered the 
political and media agenda; innovative patterns of party organisation and intra-
party democracy were introduced. The new parliament also registered an 
unusually high rate of renewal. There are various reasons for this change. The 
M5S contributed to renewing the parliamentary elite by fielding candidates 
with no previous experience in elected offices1. The 2013 parliamentary 
election was also atypical in its use of primaries - both open and closed - for the 
selection of candidates to be included on electoral lists. This practice represents 
an unprecedented novelty for the Italian political system: indeed, the majority 
of elected legislators received their nomination from intra-party democratic 
procedures. Even though primary elections are today very common among 
Italian parties (particularly left-wing parties), they had never before been used 
before at the parliamentary level. In 2013 four parties adopted primaries, 
making use of a variety of rules for achieving different levels of inclusivity 
among selectorates. Consequently, incumbent MPs were nominated through a 
number of very diverse methods, ranging from primaries to direct appointments 
by party leaders (Rombi and Seddone 2017). 
This heterogeneity is particularly useful for research on primary 
elections, as it allows for the testing of the effects of different candidate 
selection methods within the same parliament. The possibility of clarifying 
whether and to what extent adopting different levels of inclusivity may have 
driven dynamics of renewal within the parliamentary elite makes Italy an 
interesting case for investigating the impact of selection methods on 
political recruitment. 
Relevant studies have established that the systems adopted for 
electing MPs have an effect on both MPs’ characteristics and their 
parliamentary behaviour once elected. Several studies have pointed out that 
electoral rules are an important factor in explaining MPs’ legislative 
behaviour once elected, for instance, in terms of responsiveness (Crisp et al. 
2004; Jones et al. 2002). Similarly, research also suggests that electoral 
1 At that time, Beppe Grillo spoke of «forcing the parliament as a tuna can»; cfr. 
https: www.youtube.com/watch?v=AtRVm_XWzCA. 
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rules could determine the demographic features of elected officials. There is, 
for example, an extensive literature investigating the effects of gender 
quotas on the representation of women in politics (Paxton et al. 2010; 
Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Rule 1987). As electoral rules are recognised as a 
crucial factor influencing political recruitment, we could also assume that 
candidate nomination procedures might be a useful factor for understanding 
the changes among political elites. While several studies have clarified that 
the modalities used for nominations could deeply affect the characteristics 
of the political class (Hazan and Rahat 2010), the types of impacts remain in 
question. Does inclusivity in candidate selection methods boost renewal 
within parliaments? Does inclusivity hinder political parties from 
strengthening their gender balance? Does it promote generational renewal 
among political elites in terms of age or political experience? The literature 
remains inconclusive in these regards. Findings from the Israeli context 
suggest that primaries are far from improving women’s representation in 
parliament (Hazan 1997). The same holds true in the Finnish, Dutch and 
Icelandic cases studied by Hazan and Rahat (2010). Cross and Gauja (2014) 
have made similar conclusions about the Australian case. Pruysers et al. 
(2017) maintain sceptical positions in their comparative scrutiny of 19 
democracies. Primaries’ positive effects on gender balance have only been 
detected in Norway (Narud and Valen 2008), and to some extent-contra 
Hazan and Rahat (2010)-in Iceland (Indriðason and Sigurjónsdóttir 2014). 
In fact, there are arguments that a higher degree of gender equality among 
legislators is achieved when the party retains control over nominations. In 
addition, the research focusing on the renewal of party elites caused by 
inclusive selection methods is still underdeveloped. Even if there is 
agreement about the idea that primaries are a competitive arena for 
facilitating the entry of outsiders, reliable findings focusing on non-US 
cases are still lacking. Moreover, available research on party leaders 
suggests that younger and more inexperienced candidates are less likely to 
be selected when broad selectorates are involved (Sandri et al. 2015). 
This article aims to offer further empirical evidence and analysis on 
this area of research. More specifically, building on the Italian case, the 
article sheds light on the capacity of different candidate selection methods to 
facilitate the renewal of the parliamentary elite. Did the adoption of 
inclusive candidate selection methods contribute to the renewal of the Italian 
parliament that resulted from the 2013 general elections, and to what extent? 
Italy, as stated above, provides an opportunity to compare the impact of 
different candidate selection methods within the same parliament, and - as 
will be clarified below - within the same party, in terms of the renewal of 
the parliamentary elite. We focus on three dimensions of renewal: a) gender, 
that is assessing whether inclusivity in candidate selection methods may 
have contributed to increasing the quota of female legislators; b) 
generational renewal, or the age of MPs; and c) turnover, of the 
parliamentary entrance of newly elected MPs and their political experience 
before serving in parliament. Our findings suggest that inclusivity could 
affect elected officials’ profiles in terms of renewal, but this impact may 
differ when considering gender, age or seniority separately. Furthermore, 
our analyses show that, actually, even if party members and sympathisers’ 
participation in the candidate selection process ensures that there are greater 
chances of achieving renewal of political elites, parties continue to play a 
crucial role. Defining candidacy rules and ranking candidates within 
electoral lists are indeed crucial factors that affect the results of both the 
selection of nominees and, ultimately, their election to parliament. 
This article is organised through the following sections. The next 
section offers a summary of the parliamentary composition that was the 
result of the 2013 election. The third section provides an overview of the 
rules and procedures for holding primaries adopted by the four parties who 
held primaries. The fourth section represents the core of this work by 
describing the step-by-step operation of primaries in terms of representation. 
The conclusion section sums up the results and sketches the main insights to 
emerge from our analyses. 
2. The 2013 election: a new parliament 
In the 2008 parliamentary election, the right-wing coalition won a landslide 
victory. Yet, despite Silvio Berlusconi enjoying the largest parliamentary 
majority ever, this government term was plagued by a series of events that 
were unfavourable to the coalition. The coalition was shaken by partisan and 
personal struggles, through the occurrence of both financial and sexual 
scandals. When the state of the economy worsened, in November 2011, 
Berlusconi resigned under pressure (Marangoni 2011). Subsequently, a non-
partisan government was formed by the independent Mario Monti, ruling 
until December 2012. The beginning of the Monti government coincided 
with the start of a prolonged electoral campaign which lasted until February 
2013, when an early parliamentary election was called (Bosco and 
McDonnell 2012; Marangoni 2012). This election campaign was 
characterised by a negative climate of opinion. In addition to the financial 
crisis, the dissatisfaction with politics and politicians become an urgent 
issue on the political agenda. In particular, the M5S engaged in a political 
campaign against the ruling parliamentary elite, blamed the elite for its 
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inability to cope with the economic problems affecting the Italian system, 
but also for its involvement in scandals, bribery practices, and the illegal use 
of public funds. The roots of these politicians’ misconduct were precisely 
identified within electoral law, which, according to Beppe Grillo, enabled 
political parties to choose and then control elected officials. Since 2006, 
both houses of parliament have been elected through a mixed electoral 
system. This was basically a PR system with a seat bonus which gave an 
advantage to the coalition with the most votes. This system has been 
severely criticised because of its inherent tendency towards governmental 
fragmentation and instability, especially due to the attribution of Senate 
bonuses. A second criticism of the electoral system addressed the use of 
closed lists, which were in turn censured as a cause of inadequate 
representation. According to detractors, candidates for parliament were to be 
chosen through a preferential vote. Although there seemed to be significant 
agreement on this point, parliament was unable to change the rules, so that 
the method of recruitment for parliamentarians came to be a major issue. 
The rapidly-growing Movimento 5 Stelle ran in its first national 
election in 2013. Since its launch in 2009, the M5S had clearly demonstrated its 
populist and hyper-democratic ideology (Corbetta and Gualmini 2013). Both 
M5S leaders and grassroots denied the value of representative democracy. 
Thus, although disputing the impending parliamentary election, they 
relentlessly deplored the use of closed lists as an elitist and undemocratic tool 
through which to choose legislators. To obviate this lack of political 
involvement, and at the same time to emphasise their difference from 
traditional parties, the M5S resolved to make use of primary elections to 
compose their slates of candidates for both houses. The leaders then opted for 
closed primaries, reserved for part of the membership, which took place online 
from December 3 to 6, 2012 (Lanzone and Rombi 2014). 
This first move by the Movimento 5 Stelle forced the other parties to 
react. In 2012, the right-wing coalition was disputing its leadership, and in 
the last months of the year, leadership aspirants were collecting signatures 
in order to enter an open primary election the selection of candidates for 
Prime Minister. If effectively held, this primary was seen to possibly 
eventually pave the way to the use of further primaries for the selection of 
legislators. The ageing Silvio Berlusconi’s decision to lead the coalition for 
the sixth time halted the entire process, however, and the right-wing parties 
selected both their candidate for Prime Minister and their candidates for 
legislators through traditional, exclusive methods. 
The left-wing parties followed a very different narrative. They had 
previously decided to form a coalition based on Partito Democratico (PD) and 
Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (SEL), also supported by the Südtiroler Volkspartei 
(SVP), a small regionalist party representing the German-speaking minority. 
These parties had experienced intra-party democracy for at least ten years, and 
a few weeks earlier they had picked the PD’s Pier Luigi Bersani as their 
candidate for Prime Minister, using a two-round open primary election (Gelli, 
Mannarini and Talò 2013). Partially following their usual practices of internal 
democracy, and partially due to a contagion inspired by the legislative 
primaries promoted by the Movimento 5 Stelle, the three left-wing parties also 
gave their supporters a say in the selection of candidates for parliament. In 
accordance with their previous experiences, the PD and the SEL organised 
primaries open to all voters; the tiny SVP instead preferred to constrain the 
selectorate to party members. The two main parties held primaries on 
December 29 and 30, 2012 by the two main parties, while the SVP held their 
primary on 6 January 2013, a bizarre timing for Italian politics. However, 
thousands of poll stations were organised nationwide, receiving a turnout of 
about 2 millions of selectors (Musella 2014, 249). 
In addition to the surprising electoral performance of the M5S, the 
2013 election produced an unusual renewal at the parliamentary level. For 
instance, as shown in Table 1, the number of women in parliament reached 
30.5 per cent of legislators, increasing by about ten percentage points in 
comparison with the previous term. Further, the mean age of representatives 
in the 2013 parliament is 48 years old, an innovation for a parliament 
usually featuring older legislators. The last column of the table shows that 
the share of newly elected legislators is 64.1 per cent. As pointed out by De 
Lucia (2013a; 2013b), such a high turnover is second only to 1994, when 
the right-wing coalition led by Berlusconi and Forza Italia entered 
parliament, launching the so-called Second Republic2.
2 As usual in Italian politics, even in the parliament elected in 2013, floor crossing has 
been practiced by hundreds of legislators. All figures used in this article refer to the 
situation at the moment of the formation of parliament, disregarding later parliamentary 
group changes. 
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TAB. 1 - Main features of Italian legislators elected in 2013.
Political party 
Total 
legislators 
(N) 
Female 
legislators 
(%)
Mean age 
(N) 
Turnover 
rate
(%)
Partito Democratico 406 38.7 49 65.4 
Sinistra Ecologia e 
Libertà 44 27.3 46 95.5 
Südtiroler Volkspartei 11 14.3 47 85.7 
Monti coalitiona 66 14.3 53 79.1 
Popolo della Libertà 196 18.5 54 27.7 
Fratelli d’Italia 9 12.5 48 0.0 
Lega Nord 35 15.2 47 36.1 
Movimento 5 Stelle 163 37.8 37 100.0 
Others 15 18.2 47 83.3 
Total 945 30.5 48 64.1 
a: Scelta Civica, Futuro e Libertà, Unione Democratica di Centro. 
Note: Data include Valle d’Aosta and foreign electoral districts. 
Source: Adaptation from De Lucia (2013a) & CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
At glance, the four parties who made use of primaries to select their 
candidates contributed to the renewal of the parliament to a greater extent than 
those who did not use primary, on all the dimensions this study considers. Of 
course, a combination of factors may have facilitated such a change, and there 
are some remarkable exceptions, as in the case of the turnover triggered by 
Monti coalition. Nevertheless, in order to shed light on the pathways to 
parliament and to the renewal, candidate selection methods should be seriously 
taken into account. The 2013 election represents a very compelling case study 
in this regard. As a consequence of four parties’ enlargement of their 
selectorates, 53 per cent of the new parliament is made up of legislators who 
obtained their nominations by competing in a primary race. In particular, 17.9 
per cent of MPs gained their place on an electoral list through a closed primary 
(M5S and SVP), while 35 per cent competed in open primary contests (PD and 
SEL). Other parties preferred traditional selectorates, such as selection by a 
narrow party elite or candidate appointment by the party leader. Consequently, 
the incumbent Italian parliament is composed by MPs who have gained their 
nominations through various selection methods. 
3. Primary election rules 
Selecting candidates through primary elections is above all a matter of rules, 
especially when primaries are private competitions organised by political 
parties without any given laws with which to comply. This being the case in 
Italy, the lack of public regulation allowed parties to autonomously choose 
the rules about candidates, selectorates and timing, resulting in a 
heterogeneous set of procedures. Before delving into the detailes of the rules 
adopted by each of the parties, a preliminary distinction is necessary. While 
Südtiroler Volkspartei and the Movimento 5 Stelle decided to let their party 
members select all of the nominees to be included on their closed candidate 
lists, the leadership of the Partito Democratico and the Sinistra Ecologia e 
Libertà instead kept control over the lists. This means that a quota of PD and 
SEL nominees-amounting to about a quarter of all elected legislators-was 
appointed directly by party leaders, which offered them a safe place on the 
lists (Regalia and Valbruzzi 2016). 
It is now necessary to consider the rules used in defining selectorate 
inclusivity. Both the PD and the SEL resorted to open primary elections3. This 
meant that all party members and sympathisers were entitled to vote. 
Nonetheless, there were some limitations in practice. Both the PD and SEL 
allowed only selectors who had previously registered to vote in the open 
primary election for the Italia Bene Comune coalition, held in November 2012. 
By contrast, SVP and M5S organised a closed primary election where only 
party members were allowed to have a say on nominations4. Yet, while SVP 
permitted all of its 50,000 registered members to cast a vote on their 
preferences5, this membership condition was not enough for participation in the 
M5S primaries. For the M5S primaries, one needed to be registered as a M5S 
sympathiser on Beppe Grillo’s blog platform by 30 September 2012; an 
identity card showing formal registration as a party member was also required 
by 2 November 2012. These two requirements aimed to avoid the risk of instant 
membership, and to prevent cross-voting by the supporters of other parties. 
Further differences can be found when taking candidacy
requirements into account. In the PD, all party members and sympathisers 
could run as a candidate, unless they had served in parliament for more than 
two mandates (or alternatively for a total of 15 years)6. Similarly, due to 
incompatibility with a national mandate, candidacy was not permitted for 
3 Partito Democratico (2012), Primarie Parlamentari PD, 29-30 Dicembre 2012, Rego-
lamento per le candidature al Parlamento per le elezioni politiche 2013; Sinistra Ecologia e 
Libertà (2012), Regolamento per le candidature al Parlamento per le elezioni politiche 
2013.
4 Movimento 5 Stelle (2012), Regole per candidarsi e votare per le liste del MoVimento 
5 Stelle alle politiche 2013; Südtiroler Volkspartei (2012), Statuto della Südtiroler Vol-
kspartei.
5 All party members registered by December 31, 2012 were eligible to vote. The party 
registered 654 new affiliations during the two weeks preceding primary election day, 
reaching the quota of 50,668 members. 
6 Derogations for ten candidates were conceded. 
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TAB. 1 - Main features of Italian legislators elected in 2013.
Political party 
Total 
legislators 
(N) 
Female 
legislators 
(%)
Mean age 
(N) 
Turnover 
rate
(%)
Partito Democratico 406 38.7 49 65.4 
Sinistra Ecologia e 
Libertà 44 27.3 46 95.5 
Südtiroler Volkspartei 11 14.3 47 85.7 
Monti coalitiona 66 14.3 53 79.1 
Popolo della Libertà 196 18.5 54 27.7 
Fratelli d’Italia 9 12.5 48 0.0 
Lega Nord 35 15.2 47 36.1 
Movimento 5 Stelle 163 37.8 37 100.0 
Others 15 18.2 47 83.3 
Total 945 30.5 48 64.1 
a: Scelta Civica, Futuro e Libertà, Unione Democratica di Centro. 
Note: Data include Valle d’Aosta and foreign electoral districts. 
Source: Adaptation from De Lucia (2013a) & CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
At glance, the four parties who made use of primaries to select their 
candidates contributed to the renewal of the parliament to a greater extent than 
those who did not use primary, on all the dimensions this study considers. Of 
course, a combination of factors may have facilitated such a change, and there 
are some remarkable exceptions, as in the case of the turnover triggered by 
Monti coalition. Nevertheless, in order to shed light on the pathways to 
parliament and to the renewal, candidate selection methods should be seriously 
taken into account. The 2013 election represents a very compelling case study 
in this regard. As a consequence of four parties’ enlargement of their 
selectorates, 53 per cent of the new parliament is made up of legislators who 
obtained their nominations by competing in a primary race. In particular, 17.9 
per cent of MPs gained their place on an electoral list through a closed primary 
(M5S and SVP), while 35 per cent competed in open primary contests (PD and 
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narrow party elite or candidate appointment by the party leader. Consequently, 
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3. Primary election rules 
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preferences5, this membership condition was not enough for participation in the 
M5S primaries. For the M5S primaries, one needed to be registered as a M5S 
sympathiser on Beppe Grillo’s blog platform by 30 September 2012; an 
identity card showing formal registration as a party member was also required 
by 2 November 2012. These two requirements aimed to avoid the risk of instant 
membership, and to prevent cross-voting by the supporters of other parties. 
Further differences can be found when taking candidacy
requirements into account. In the PD, all party members and sympathisers 
could run as a candidate, unless they had served in parliament for more than 
two mandates (or alternatively for a total of 15 years)6. Similarly, due to 
incompatibility with a national mandate, candidacy was not permitted for 
3 Partito Democratico (2012), Primarie Parlamentari PD, 29-30 Dicembre 2012, Rego-
lamento per le candidature al Parlamento per le elezioni politiche 2013; Sinistra Ecologia e 
Libertà (2012), Regolamento per le candidature al Parlamento per le elezioni politiche 
2013.
4 Movimento 5 Stelle (2012), Regole per candidarsi e votare per le liste del MoVimento 
5 Stelle alle politiche 2013; Südtiroler Volkspartei (2012), Statuto della Südtiroler Vol-
kspartei.
5 All party members registered by December 31, 2012 were eligible to vote. The party 
registered 654 new affiliations during the two weeks preceding primary election day, 
reaching the quota of 50,668 members. 
6 Derogations for ten candidates were conceded. 
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those serving in local, regional or EU institutions. Potential nominees were 
required to have the endorsement of 5 per cent of party members registered 
in at least three local party sections (circoli) of the electoral district where 
they sought candidacy7. Finally, the provincial party offices approved 
nominations and prepared the primary lists. Similar rules for candidacy were 
adopted by the SEL, but in their case, regulations did not provide any 
explicit instructions about endorsements. In the case of the SEL, the 
regional party leadership was entitled to set the primary list to be presented 
to selectors. As for the SVP, running in primary elections was defined by 
local party sections - the circondari - taking into account one restriction: 
candidacy was not allowed for those elected officials who had served more 
than 25 years in public office. 
In distinction from the other parties’ primary processes, the M5S’s 
entire primary process was governed directly by the party leadership at the 
national level. Candidacy requirements for competing in a parlamentarie were 
also quite dissimilar. Firstly, aspiring candidates were asked to provide a 
certification of a lack of criminal record. Secondly, they had to prove that they 
were not a member of other political parties. Aspiring candidates were also 
required to residency in the electoral district where they presented their 
candidacy. Finally, candidacy was open only to those who had previously been 
a candidate but had not been elected in the local and regional elections in which 
the M5S had participated between 2008 and 2012. According to Gualmini 
(2013), the party suffered from a lack of experienced elected officials, so it was 
strategic to rely on candidates who had previously run in elections. Moreover, 
this also created a greater dependency on the central party, ensuring loyal 
parliamentary behaviour once elected8. The party leadership had the power to 
validate the list of candidates running in primaries. 
Remarkable differences existed between parties in terms of the 
expression of the vote. PD selectors could cast up to two preferences within 
a unique list of candidates, without any distinction between the two houses, 
under the condition of selecting candidates of different genders. Two 
preferences for candidates of the same sex were voided. The SEL offered 
selectors the opportunity to cast up to two preferences by gender as well, but 
in their case selectors were provided with two different lists of candidates 
7 A qualified majority of 2/3s by the regional party leadership could lower the 
endorsements required to 3 per cent. Those currently serving in parliament were exempted 
from collecting signatures endorsing their candidacy for primary elections.
8 In this regard, an only exception was given to those running in the five foreign 
electoral districts. These candidates were only asked to fulfil the registered membership 
requirements. 
(one per gender) for each house. By contrast, SVP applied its usual rule for 
internal voting procedures: selectors could cast a number of preferences, 
adding up to 1/3 of the listed candidates9. M5S permitted up to three 
preferences without any formal provisions about equality between the sexes. 
Parties also adopted different procedures regarding the composition
of lists10. The main norm was the total number of votes won by a candidate. 
The PD and the SEL then combined the candidates selected through 
primaries with those picked by party leaders. Afterward, for the PD the 
procedure was complicated by the fact that all primary candidates were 
running within a unique list, without a distinction between lower and upper 
house. The distribution of nominees within the electoral lists was organised 
by the regional party leadership. In order to preserve and facilitate territorial 
representation, and taking into account the PD’s results in the last general 
election, each province (district) was assigned a number of places within the 
list11. Then, nominees were fielded within the list in accordance with the 
result of the primary elections. To enhance gender balance, a principle of 
alternating between candidates of different genders was applied. Party lists 
have thus been arranged according to several criteria: territorial 
representation, primary results, leadership adjustment, age requirements set 
by the Italian constitution to be eligible for the Senate, and gender balance. 
For the SEL, placing candidates was simpler. Since primary 
candidates were already divided between the two houses, the age 
requirements had been met in advance, and the party on had to consider 
primary results, leadership adjustments, and gender balance. 
For the Movimento 5 Stelle, two criteria were considered: the 
number of votes achieved by a candidate and age. When composing the 
party lists, distinction was given to Senate candidates, considering the 
necessary age requirements. Once the lists for Senate were set, the 
remaining candidates were distributed into the lower house lists in 
accordance with their primary results. No gender criteria were explicitly 
applied. Similarly, the SVP appointed its nominees by taking into account 
9 Even if no formal provision concerning gender balance was explicitly set in the voting 
rules, it must be pointed out that according to the SVP statute a proportion of at least ¼ of 
the all candidates in primary elections is usually reserved for women. 
10 To ensure minority representation, special provisions within the electoral system 
require SVP candidates to compete in one-member districts. Candidates from this party do 
not enter slates. 
11 The distribution of places per district has been accomplished according to the Sainte-
Laguë formula. 
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(2013), the party suffered from a lack of experienced elected officials, so it was 
strategic to rely on candidates who had previously run in elections. Moreover, 
this also created a greater dependency on the central party, ensuring loyal 
parliamentary behaviour once elected8. The party leadership had the power to 
validate the list of candidates running in primaries. 
Remarkable differences existed between parties in terms of the 
expression of the vote. PD selectors could cast up to two preferences within 
a unique list of candidates, without any distinction between the two houses, 
under the condition of selecting candidates of different genders. Two 
preferences for candidates of the same sex were voided. The SEL offered 
selectors the opportunity to cast up to two preferences by gender as well, but 
in their case selectors were provided with two different lists of candidates 
7 A qualified majority of 2/3s by the regional party leadership could lower the 
endorsements required to 3 per cent. Those currently serving in parliament were exempted 
from collecting signatures endorsing their candidacy for primary elections.
8 In this regard, an only exception was given to those running in the five foreign 
electoral districts. These candidates were only asked to fulfil the registered membership 
requirements. 
(one per gender) for each house. By contrast, SVP applied its usual rule for 
internal voting procedures: selectors could cast a number of preferences, 
adding up to 1/3 of the listed candidates9. M5S permitted up to three 
preferences without any formal provisions about equality between the sexes. 
Parties also adopted different procedures regarding the composition
of lists10. The main norm was the total number of votes won by a candidate. 
The PD and the SEL then combined the candidates selected through 
primaries with those picked by party leaders. Afterward, for the PD the 
procedure was complicated by the fact that all primary candidates were 
running within a unique list, without a distinction between lower and upper 
house. The distribution of nominees within the electoral lists was organised 
by the regional party leadership. In order to preserve and facilitate territorial 
representation, and taking into account the PD’s results in the last general 
election, each province (district) was assigned a number of places within the 
list11. Then, nominees were fielded within the list in accordance with the 
result of the primary elections. To enhance gender balance, a principle of 
alternating between candidates of different genders was applied. Party lists 
have thus been arranged according to several criteria: territorial 
representation, primary results, leadership adjustment, age requirements set 
by the Italian constitution to be eligible for the Senate, and gender balance. 
For the SEL, placing candidates was simpler. Since primary 
candidates were already divided between the two houses, the age 
requirements had been met in advance, and the party on had to consider 
primary results, leadership adjustments, and gender balance. 
For the Movimento 5 Stelle, two criteria were considered: the 
number of votes achieved by a candidate and age. When composing the 
party lists, distinction was given to Senate candidates, considering the 
necessary age requirements. Once the lists for Senate were set, the 
remaining candidates were distributed into the lower house lists in 
accordance with their primary results. No gender criteria were explicitly 
applied. Similarly, the SVP appointed its nominees by taking into account 
9 Even if no formal provision concerning gender balance was explicitly set in the voting 
rules, it must be pointed out that according to the SVP statute a proportion of at least ¼ of 
the all candidates in primary elections is usually reserved for women. 
10 To ensure minority representation, special provisions within the electoral system 
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the votes won in primary elections. Table 2 summarises the rules used in the 
2013 legislative primaries by the parties discussed. 
TAB. 2 - Main features of primaries for selecting 2013 nominees.
Political 
party Selectorate
Candidacy 
requirements 
Expression of 
the vote 
Electoral list 
composition 
Partito 
Democratico All voters 
Less than two 
mandates as 
elected official at 
national level 
5 per cent 
endorsements by 
party members  
Up to two 
preferences 
(gender 
condition) 
Territorial 
representation 
Number of votes 
Gender alternation 
Age requirement 
(Senate) 
Head of the list 
appointed by 
party leader 
Sinistra
Ecologia e 
Libertà
All voters 
Less than two 
mandates as 
elected official at 
national level 
5 per cent 
endorsements by 
party members 
Up to two 
preferences  
Number of votes 
Gender alternation 
Age requirement 
(Senate) 
Head of the list 
appointed by 
party leader 
Südtiroler 
Volkspartei 
Only 
members 
(without 
additional 
requirements) 
Selection by 
local sections 
(circondari)
Preferences 
allowed were at 
a maximum of 
1/3 of 
candidates 
running 
Number of votes 
Movimento 
5 Stelle 
Only 
members 
(with
additional 
requirements) 
Having run as an 
M5S candidate 
(not elected) in 
previous local 
elections
Any mandate as 
elected official 
Up to three 
preferences 
Number of votes 
Age requirement 
(Senate) 
The process of selecting the political class could be described as a 
funnel. This is to say that each step leads to a restriction in the number of 
people involved. At the start, all citizens are in principle eligible to run for 
political office. However, as a result of self-selection which excludes those 
uninterested in politics, those who aspire to a political career make up only 
one part of the broader citizenry. Among these, an even smaller number 
chooses to enter politics. They have two main ways of pursue this 
aspiration. They may compete in an open race, as happens when a party 
promotes primary elections; alternatively, they can be appointed by party 
leaders or by a party board, through an exclusive process. Finally, those who 
survive these steps, and win a sufficient number of votes or an high position 
on a list, as based on different electoral systems, succeed in becoming 
elected legislators. 
In this article, we consider the final stages of this process for the four 
Italian parties that ran primary elections in 201312. To do so, we first 
consider those aspiring to enter a list of candidates for parliamentary 
elections, then the legislative candidates actually fielded, and finally the 
restricted group of elected representatives. It is helpful to begin by assessing 
those aspiring to enter a list of candidates, as shown in Table 3. The two 
houses of the Italian parliament are composed of 945 seats13. There were 
3,599 total candidates for a party nomination, with the regionalist SVP 
choosing among a very small number. The table reports the three selection 
methods described in the previous section. 
TAB. 3 - Aspirants to enter a list according to their partisanship and method of selection.
Leader appointment Closed primaries Open primaries 
Political party N % N % N % Total 
Partito 
Democratico 249 21.8 0 0.0 894 78.2 1,143 
Sinistra Ecologia e 
Libertà 499 52.2 0 0.0 457 47.8 956 
Südtiroler 
Volkspartei 5 35.7 9 64.3 0 0.0 14
Movimento 5 
Stelle 0 0.0 1,486 100.0 0 0.0 1,486 
All aspirants 753 20.9 1,495 41.6 1,351 37.5 3,599 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
Table 4 shows that 2,674 of the original aspirants for candidacy-out 
of the original 3,599-were fielded as candidates by one of the four parties. 
12 As concerns the Movimento 5 Stelle, according to data released by organizers, 20,252 
party members participated in the so-called Parlamentarie. This makes up 64.1 per cent of 
31,612 eligible voters. The Partito Democratico mobilized 2,096,884 selectors, or about 24 
per cent of the number of PD voters in the 2013 general elections (Musella 2014, 249). For 
the SEL’s open primaries and the SVP’s closed primaries, official participation data were 
not released by organizers.
13 The Lower House features 630 representatives, while the Upper House is composed 
of 315 senators. Five additional non-elected senators with a life-long tenure are appointed 
by the President of the Republic. 
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The process of selecting the political class could be described as a 
funnel. This is to say that each step leads to a restriction in the number of 
people involved. At the start, all citizens are in principle eligible to run for 
political office. However, as a result of self-selection which excludes those 
uninterested in politics, those who aspire to a political career make up only 
one part of the broader citizenry. Among these, an even smaller number 
chooses to enter politics. They have two main ways of pursue this 
aspiration. They may compete in an open race, as happens when a party 
promotes primary elections; alternatively, they can be appointed by party 
leaders or by a party board, through an exclusive process. Finally, those who 
survive these steps, and win a sufficient number of votes or an high position 
on a list, as based on different electoral systems, succeed in becoming 
elected legislators. 
In this article, we consider the final stages of this process for the four 
Italian parties that ran primary elections in 201312. To do so, we first 
consider those aspiring to enter a list of candidates for parliamentary 
elections, then the legislative candidates actually fielded, and finally the 
restricted group of elected representatives. It is helpful to begin by assessing 
those aspiring to enter a list of candidates, as shown in Table 3. The two 
houses of the Italian parliament are composed of 945 seats13. There were 
3,599 total candidates for a party nomination, with the regionalist SVP 
choosing among a very small number. The table reports the three selection 
methods described in the previous section. 
TAB. 3 - Aspirants to enter a list according to their partisanship and method of selection.
Leader appointment Closed primaries Open primaries 
Political party N % N % N % Total 
Partito 
Democratico 249 21.8 0 0.0 894 78.2 1,143 
Sinistra Ecologia e 
Libertà 499 52.2 0 0.0 457 47.8 956 
Südtiroler 
Volkspartei 5 35.7 9 64.3 0 0.0 14
Movimento 5 
Stelle 0 0.0 1,486 100.0 0 0.0 1,486 
All aspirants 753 20.9 1,495 41.6 1,351 37.5 3,599 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
Table 4 shows that 2,674 of the original aspirants for candidacy-out 
of the original 3,599-were fielded as candidates by one of the four parties. 
12 As concerns the Movimento 5 Stelle, according to data released by organizers, 20,252 
party members participated in the so-called Parlamentarie. This makes up 64.1 per cent of 
31,612 eligible voters. The Partito Democratico mobilized 2,096,884 selectors, or about 24 
per cent of the number of PD voters in the 2013 general elections (Musella 2014, 249). For 
the SEL’s open primaries and the SVP’s closed primaries, official participation data were 
not released by organizers.
13 The Lower House features 630 representatives, while the Upper House is composed 
of 315 senators. Five additional non-elected senators with a life-long tenure are appointed 
by the President of the Republic. 
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While in the first stage the greatest number of candidates had to compete in 
closed primaries, most of these candidates were in fact selected through 
open primaries in the second stage. Further, avoiding party competitions, all 
candidates appointed by the leaders of their respective parties directly 
obtained a nomination. 
TAB. 4 - Legislative candidates according to their partisanship and method of selection.
Leader appointment Closed primaries Open primaries 
Political party N % N % N % Total 
Partito 
Democratico 249 27.0 0 0.0 672 73.0 921 
Sinistra Ecologia  
e Libertà 499 54.4 0 0.0 418 45.6 917 
Südtiroler 
Volkspartei 5 35.7 9 64.3 0 0.0 14
Movimento 5 
Stelle 0 0.0 822 100.0 0 0.0 822 
All candidates 753 28.2 831 31.1 1,090 40.7 2,674 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
It has been well established that when PR with a closed list is used to 
elect a parliament, a candidate’s position in a slate is crucial to gaining a 
seat. In practice, only candidates ranking near the top of the slate are 
competitive, while those filling the lower positions are simply currently 
following their party’s instructions in order to eventually begin a political 
career in the future. Table 5 details the median slate position of the 
candidates fielded by the PD and the SEL in both houses, taking into 
account their selection method14. In the case of the PD, the median 
candidate picked by open primaries is ranked higher in the Lower House 
slate and lower in the Upper House slate, but in both cases the differences 
are unremarkable. When considering the SEL, by contrast the median 
candidates selected through open primaries are ranked significantly higher 
in both slates. This means that although leaders have appointed several 
candidates, they have not seized all safe slate positions. In sum, the use of 
primaries has been effective rather than ornamental. 
14 The SVP and the M5S cannot be examined from this point of view because in South 
Tyrol – the area where the SVP operates – a plurality based on single member districts is 
used, and no slate is therefore put together; the M5S has only made use of closed primaries 
so it is not possible to contrast their different selection methods. 
TAB. 5 - Partito Democratico and Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà, position in the list 
according to party, method of selection and House.
Leader appointment Open primaries 
Political party House Median N Median N
Lower House 16 158 13 458 Partito 
Democratico Upper House 9 87 10.5 214 
Lower House 18.5 352 8 264 Sinistra Ecologia e
Libertà Upper House 17 147 6.5 154 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
Figure 1 should clarify the situation. It shows the rank of legislative 
candidates to the Lower House fielded by the SEL, according to their 
selection method. It appears that the positions on the left-corresponding to a 
safe rank on the slate-are mainly filled by candidates selected through open 
primaries. It must be noted that the predominance of leader appointed 
candidates in the top position-rank 1-corresponds to a precise party strategy: 
being a leader-based party, the SEL decided to place its leader Nichi 
Vendola as the top candidate in 25 electoral districts. Having as a result 
been elected in several different districts, Vendola opted to represent one of 
these, paving the way to parliament for his party to be second-ranked in 24 
districts, most selected through primaries15.
FIG. 1 - Rank of the Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà legislative candidates according to their 
method of selection, Lower House (N=616).
15 Being in office as president of the Apulia region, Vendola served at the national level 
for just one month; on 16 April 2013 he resigned from his parliamentary seat. 
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in both slates. This means that although leaders have appointed several 
candidates, they have not seized all safe slate positions. In sum, the use of 
primaries has been effective rather than ornamental. 
14 The SVP and the M5S cannot be examined from this point of view because in South 
Tyrol – the area where the SVP operates – a plurality based on single member districts is 
used, and no slate is therefore put together; the M5S has only made use of closed primaries 
so it is not possible to contrast their different selection methods. 
TAB. 5 - Partito Democratico and Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà, position in the list 
according to party, method of selection and House.
Leader appointment Open primaries 
Political party House Median N Median N
Lower House 16 158 13 458 Partito 
Democratico Upper House 9 87 10.5 214 
Lower House 18.5 352 8 264 Sinistra Ecologia e
Libertà Upper House 17 147 6.5 154 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
Figure 1 should clarify the situation. It shows the rank of legislative 
candidates to the Lower House fielded by the SEL, according to their 
selection method. It appears that the positions on the left-corresponding to a 
safe rank on the slate-are mainly filled by candidates selected through open 
primaries. It must be noted that the predominance of leader appointed 
candidates in the top position-rank 1-corresponds to a precise party strategy: 
being a leader-based party, the SEL decided to place its leader Nichi 
Vendola as the top candidate in 25 electoral districts. Having as a result 
been elected in several different districts, Vendola opted to represent one of 
these, paving the way to parliament for his party to be second-ranked in 24 
districts, most selected through primaries15.
FIG. 1 - Rank of the Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà legislative candidates according to their 
method of selection, Lower House (N=616).
15 Being in office as president of the Apulia region, Vendola served at the national level 
for just one month; on 16 April 2013 he resigned from his parliamentary seat. 
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The outcomes of these slate composition strategies is made evident 
in Table 6, where-focusing on the four parties under consideration-613 
elected legislators out of 2,674 candidates are classified according to their 
partisanship and method of selection. To the extent that these four parties 
are considered, a majority of legislators (51.2 per cent) entered parliament 
after a selection based on open primaries, more than a quarter-thanks to the 
exceptional success of the M5S-were selected through closed primaries, and 
lastly a minority, just over one fifth (21.2 per cent) were leader appointed. 
The table makes clear that in the case of the two left-wing parties the use of 
appointment has been extensive, but open primaries still predominated. 
TAB. 6 - Elected legislators according to their partisanship and method of selection.
Leader appointment Closed primaries Open primaries 
Political party N % N % N % Total 
Partito 
Democratico 114 28.6 0 0.0 285 71.4 399 
Sinistra Ecologia e 
Libertà 15 34.1 0 0.0 29 65.9 44
Südtiroler 
Volkspartei 1 14.3 6 85.7 0 0.0 7
Movimento 5 
Stelle 0 0.0 163 100.0 0 0.0 163 
All legislators  130 21.2 169 27.6 314 51.2 613 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
Thus far we have illustrated the recruitment processes used by four 
Italian parties in the lead-up to the 2013 parliamentary election. We have 
seen that three of these parties preferred mixed strategies, while the M5S 
exclusively relied on closed primaries. We have considered three phases in 
the recruitment of legislators, corresponding to the screening of aspirants for 
candidacy to a candidate list composed through primaries or leader 
appointment, to the composition of the slates of legislative candidates 
fielded to contest the campaign, to the election of legislators. Looking 
forward, we now face the question of whether these steps are neutral. In 
other words, we will examine whether the process of recruitment is random, 
or rather whether a given type of candidate systematically prevails. To 
unravel this problem, in the next section we assess the different weights of 
gender, age and seniority in the consecutive recruitment stages. 
4. Stages of recruitment, methods of selection and candidate profiles 
Gender. - Before beginning the analyses of the influence of recruitment on 
candidate profiles it is important to recall some caveats to our case study 
and the parties we are working on. Firstly, the role of the SVP is in practice 
irrelevant because of the low number of candidates fielded; secondly, and 
consequently, the results of closed primaries are entirely ascribable to the 
M5S’s candidates; thirdly, the results referring to open primaries and leader 
appointments are jointly generated by the PD and SEL candidates. 
In sum, even though candidate selection is heavily influenced by the 
political system at large and by electoral rules, parties are still the pivotal 
players. Thus, looking at Table 7, the attitudes of the M5S towards gender 
balance may explain the low number of female candidates to enter that 
party’s candidate list. Women make up only 13 per cent of total candidates, 
leaving male candidate a huge majority of 87 per cent. However, the method 
of selection used by the M5S appears to be unquestionably woman-friendly. 
In fact, the primary results allowed 152 female candidates out of 194 total to 
be fielded, with a growth in percentage up to 18.3. Moreover, the female 
M5S nominees ranked high in the slates of both houses. The median rank 
for women was 6 for the Lower House and 5 for the Upper House, as 
compared with 12 and 9 in the case of male candidates. As a consequence, 
63 female nominees were elected, boosting the percentage of the M5S’s 
female legislators up to 37.4. It should be emphasised that this impressive 
promotion of female parliamentary representation has been accomplished 
without any endorsement coming from rules since the M5S’s closed 
primaries did not include any form of gender equality. 
TAB. 7 - Stages of candidate recruitment, methods of selection and the occurrence of 
female politicians.
Female aspirants  
to enter a list 
Female  
legislative candidates 
Female  
legislators 
Method of selection N % N % N %
Leader appointment 276 36.7 276 36.7 33 25.4 
Closed primaries 194 13.0 152 18.3 63 37.3 
Open primaries 657 48.6 534 49.0 133 42.4 
All methods 1,127 31.3 962 64.0 229 37.4 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
As previously emphasised, appointments made by party leaders were 
used by the PD and the SEL. As this is a non-competitive form of selection, all 
276 female aspirants for candidacy entered the slates of candidates for one the 
houses. However, only 33 were actually elected as representatives, dropping to 
a quarter of legislators selected through this method. Taking into account the 
female politicians who faced open primaries, we are dealing with a competitive 
selection, where the percentage of legislative candidates (49.0) is near equal to 
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that of candidate for nomination (48.6). Moreover, the quota of female 
legislators, in comparison with that for candidates, is substantial, dropping only 
from 49 to 42.4 percent. Therefore, open primary selection provided female 
candidates a good chance of winning a parliamentary seat, especially as 
compared to appointment by party leaders. However, it should be noted that 
this effect has not been produced by selectors’ preference for female candidates 
during the primaries, or by a predilection among general voters for female 
legislative candidates. Rather, along all recruitment stages, the PD and the SEL 
have chosen rules that promote the presence of women among candidates in the 
primaries and the parliamentary elections. Again, the decisions of central party 
offices appear more significant than the methods of selection. 
Age. - Figure 2 describes the age profile of the aspirants for candidacy to a 
candidate list, according to their partisanship16. The age cohorts from the 
youngest to about 50-years-old are clearly dominated by the M5S aspirants. The 
M5S’s numbers plummet abruptly in the older age brackets, where the PD and 
SEL aspirants dominate with a similar profile. Descriptives provide an accurate 
measure of these differences. While the overall mean age of all aspirants for 
candidacy is 46, and the average for other parties’ aspirants for candidacy-the 
SVP included-is 48, the aspirants fielded by the M5S average only 42-years-old. 
FIG. 2 - Age profiles of the aspirants to enter a list, by party (N=3,580).
16 SVP candidates are not reported in this figure because of their low numbers. Note that 
although in Italy the minimum age to be elected is 25 for the Lower House, and 40 for the 
Upper House, the SEL allowed a 22-year-old candidate to run in primary elections. He was 
later–inescapably–discarded from the party slate for the parliamentary election. 
In contrast to gender, the variable age may be measured according to 
different criteria. Here for the sake of clarity, we prefer to deal with two 
groups, half split according to the median value of the aspirants’ age (46 
years). Therefore, all politicians-aspirants to candidacy, candidates and 
legislators-above that age are considered senior, while those under that age 
are considered young. Like women, young and presumably less resourced 
candidates are supposed to be at a disadvantage in their efforts to enter 
parliament. Nevertheless, while the rules adopted by the two major left-
wing parties were explicitly aimed at enhancing the representation of 
women, no provision was meant to enhance the representation of the young. 
Thus, the changes in the politicians’ age profiles along the stages of 
recruitment shown in Table 8 should mainly be considered an outcome of 
selectors’ unconstrained choices. 
TAB. 8 - Stages of candidate recruitment, methods of selection and the occurrence of young 
politicians.
Young aspirants  
to enter a list 
Young 
legislative candidates 
Young 
legislators 
Method of 
selection N % N % N %
Leader
appointment 298 39.6 298 39.6 39 30.0 
Closed primaries 957 64.0 528 63.5 139 82.2 
Open primaries 541 40.2 439 40.3 130 41.4 
All methods 1,796 50.0 1,265 47.3 308 50.2 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
First, young politicians predominate among those selected through 
closed primaries, due to the Movimento 5 Stelle’s organisation and 
recruitment strategies. While this is an obvious consideration, it is notable 
that in this party, younger people made up a vast majority of the aspirants 
for candidacy (64 per cent), and these aspirants to candidacy made it to the 
party’s slates in more or less the same proportion (63.5 per cent). Above all, 
younger aspirants for candidacy did well in the primaries, and could be 
elected as legislators through a very large majority, amounting to 82.2 per 
cent of the M5S’s parliamentary groups. The pattern is very similar for 
those politicians selected through open primaries. These politicians came 
from the two left-wing parties where senior politicians predominate. Hence, 
young aspirants to candidacy made up only 40.2 per cent of total aspirants 
for candidacy. However, they were screened through open primaries in the 
same proportion (40.3), and according to their success, were then elected as 
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First, young politicians predominate among those selected through 
closed primaries, due to the Movimento 5 Stelle’s organisation and 
recruitment strategies. While this is an obvious consideration, it is notable 
that in this party, younger people made up a vast majority of the aspirants 
for candidacy (64 per cent), and these aspirants to candidacy made it to the 
party’s slates in more or less the same proportion (63.5 per cent). Above all, 
younger aspirants for candidacy did well in the primaries, and could be 
elected as legislators through a very large majority, amounting to 82.2 per 
cent of the M5S’s parliamentary groups. The pattern is very similar for 
those politicians selected through open primaries. These politicians came 
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legislators in an analogous proportion (41.4 per cent). The story is different 
in the case of leader appointed younger politicians. These aspirants for 
candidacy were still fielded by the PD and the SEL, more or less in the same 
proportion (39.6) as the aspirants for candidacy facing open primaries. All 
of the leader-selected candidates entered the slates for the parliamentary 
election, avoiding any competition. They were evidently ranked quite low, 
and only 30 per cent became legislators. 
The above analyses clarify how, in the 2013 parliamentary election, the 
outcomes for younger aspirants for candidacy improved when their selection 
took place through primary elections. This effect is even more noteworthy in 
the case of closed primaries. The latter should be attributed to the fact that the 
closed primary method was utilised by the Movimento 5 Stelle, a new party 
formed by young candidates, militants and voters17. Similarly, open primaries’ 
friendliness to the young, although a factor, has been limited by the PD and the 
SEL’s organisation practices. In these parties, young candidates appointed by 
leaders have been ranked low in the slates, resulting in their underrepresented in 
parliament in comparison with their senior party co-members. It thus appears 
that leader appointments and primary elections play a very different role in the 
promotion of young candidates. 
Turnover. - The Italian First Republic (1945-1992) featured typical mass 
parties. Constrained by those organisations, the careers of prospective poli-
ticians usually started at the local level. When successful, politicians advan-
ced to the national level to experience some parliamentary terms. The 
governmental elite was regularly recruited from among parliamentarians. 
Today a cursus honorum still exists, but since the 1994 parliamentary 
election political careers have deeply changed (Verzichelli 1997). Initial po-
litical experiences may now be carried out at different levels of government, 
from local, to national, to European. A direct entry in national politics while 
lacking previous experience in partisan or local politics is now common. 
These changing patterns in the course of political careers make it 
difficult to differentiate the more experienced politicians from the less 
experienced. For the sake of simplicity, here we again make use of a 
dichotomous variable. Given that we are dealing with a national-level event-
the 2013 parliamentary election-we consider as experienced politicians who 
have served at least one previous parliamentary term; those without any 
parliamentary experienced are described as inexperienced. Table 9 presents 
17 On the age profile of the M5S voters cfr. Maraffi, Pedrazzani and Pinto 2013, 58; of 
the members cfr. Lanzone 2015, 95; of the legislators cfr. Lanzone 2015, 122-123. 
the distribution of the aspirants to candidacy to enter a list according to their 
partisanship and national political experience. The innovative role of the 
Movimento 5 Stelle appears quite evident, due to its above-discussed 
selection rules, which, at every level, explicitly excluded aspirants to 
candidacy with any previous experience. The PD and the SEL also notably 
feature a huge majority of inexperienced aspirants to candidacy18.
TAB. 9 - Aspirants to enter a list by political party and national political experience.
 Inexperienced aspirants Experienced aspirants  
Political party N % N % Total 
Partito 
Democratico 934 26.0 209 5.7 1,143 
Sinistra Ecologia e 
Libertà 952 26.4 4 0.1 956 
Südtiroler 
Volkspartei 13 0.4 1 0.1 14 
Movimento 5 
Stelle 1,486 41.3 0 0.0 1,486 
All aspirants 3,385 94.1 214 5.9 3,599 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
Table 10 details the outcomes for inexperienced politicians along all 
three stages of the legislative recruitment process and in reference to their 
method of selection. First, closed primaries have permitted the election of a 
whole cluster of novices mainly made up of the M5S parliamentarians, with 
the only exception being an incumbent legislator from the Südtiroler 
Volkspartei. As noted above, this result has been completely predetermined 
by the M5S’s leadership requirements for standing for nomination. The 
inexperienced performed quite well at open primaries. They made up 88.7 
percent of all aspirants to candidacy, and a respectable 87.6 percent entered 
one of the slates of legislative candidates. Among these, however, only 69.7 
percent were gained a parliamentary seat. It appears that the inexperience’s 
primacy performance was sufficient for gaining a place on a slate, but not 
good enough to gain a safe ranking on that slate. Finally, among those 
aspirants to candidacy appointed by the party leaders, 92 percent were 
18 An overlap may be suspected between inexperienced politicians and the younger 
aspirants to candidacy examined in the previous section. However, the inexperienced are 
nearly equally divided between younger and senior, using the definitions noted above. Out 
of 3,380 aspirants to candidacy for whom we have the necessary information, 1,762 were 
young and 1,618 were senior. 
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inexperienced. Elected legislators coming from this group made up only 
66.9 percent, a greater reduction in comparison with those selected through 
open primaries. 
TAB. 10 - Stages of candidate recruitment, methods of selection and the occurrence of 
inexperienced politicians.
Inexperienced aspirants  
to enter a list 
Inexperienced  
legislative candidates 
Inexperienced 
Legislators 
Method of 
selection N % N % N %
Leader
appointment 693 92.0 693 92.0 87 66.9 
Closed 
primaries 1,494 99.9 830 99.9 168 99.4 
Open primaries 1,198 88.7 955 87.6 219 69.7 
All methods 3,385 94.1 2,478 92.7 474 77.3 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
According to these analyses, the 2013 parliamentary election brought 
about the unprecedented parliamentary entry of inexperienced legislators, 
especially due to the Movimento 5 Stelle’s choice to field only novice 
candidates. It should also be noted that the methods of selection used by 
other parties have facilitated this renewal, but that not all methods have 
contributed in the same ways. Open primaries seem to be more friendly to 
the inexperienced than leader appointments, although not with the same 
strength revealed in the case of young and female politicians. 
5. Conclusion
The analyses presented in this article have illustrated how, during the 2013 
Italian parliamentary election, both closed and open primaries have 
promoted a process of renewal among the legislators of the four parties that 
used primaries. By examining the stages of candidate selection we have 
detected an innovation autonomously produced by primaries in all three 
dimensions of the renewal, specifically gender (re)balance, generational 
renewal, and turnover. Moreover, in all cases, primaries are considerably 
more renewal-friendly than leader appointments. This is true either when 
considering outcomes for aspirants to candidacy from the four parties using 
different selection methods, or when contrasting these parties with those-
mostly right-wing-using only leader appointments. 
More specifically, in the case of closed primaries, we noticed that the 
quota of women increases at each step of the selection procedure, and the 
same also applies for the age dimension. Even if the proportion of young 
legislative candidates is slightly lower that that registered for young 
aspirants to candidacy (0.5 percentage points) it appears that the vote of 
party members provided these aspirants to candidacy placement at the top of 
the party lists and thus election to parliament. This could be only partially 
explained by referring to the role played by the M5S, a new party entering 
parliament. A similar pattern is also registered for legislators who gained 
their nomination through open primaries. Here, we have showed that while 
the representation of women is in part affected by the specific rules used by 
the parties to strengthen the gender balance among MPs, there are also signs 
of renewal related to the age dimension at each step of the selection 
procedure. Bu contrast, as concerns the dimension of seniority, we saw that 
what mattered most for facilitating renewal was the role played by the 
central party office and the requirements for running in primaries. 
In any case, however, this is not the full story. We have discovered 
that inclusive selectorates are by and large renewal-oriented. Yet, this 
potential is to some extent constrained by the rules of selection, which are 
autonomously defined by parties themselves. Among the cases under 
investigation, the clearest case in point, of a fully constrained selectorate, 
with reference to candidacy, is voters in the Movimento 5 Stelle’s closed 
primaries. In that case, the central office decided to field exclusively
aspirants to candidacy who lacked any previous seniority or experience; 
thus, primary voters were allowed to select exclusively inexperienced 
candidates, and the resulting parliamentary group has been composed 
exclusively by novices. M5S members’ support for political change is 
undisputable. However, when voting in their own primaries, from the point 
of view of seniority, they had the single option to renew. 
The provisions applied in the PD and SEL’s open primaries which 
sought gender balance, are an example of noteworthy, if not complete, 
constraints on voters’ attitudes. In these parties’ primaries, selectors were 
allowed to vote for two candidates, provided they were of different genders, 
but each selector was also free to vote for a single candidate. However, the 
slates for the parliamentary election were arranged ex post using the so-
called zip method, alternating male and female candidates ordered according 
to the results of the primaries. In this practice, voters were quite free when 
casting their primary ballots, but in the last analysis the growing presence of 
women in parliament has been again largely predetermined by the rules 
created by the two parties’ central offices. 
In the case of all parties, young and presumably less resourced aspirants 
to candidacy have not been supported by specific rules as women have. 
34
inexperienced. Elected legislators coming from this group made up only 
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Legislators 
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selection N % N % N %
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Open primaries 1,198 88.7 955 87.6 219 69.7 
All methods 3,385 94.1 2,478 92.7 474 77.3 
Source: CLS-Candidate and Leader Selection. 
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Nevertheless, while younger politicians have been completely disregarded by 
the SVP, the term limits used by the two left-wing parties and the M5S at least 
indirectly advanced young candidates barring repeated candidacies by a 
number of incumbents. Those limits were enforced by the PD and the SEL, 
who nonetheless tolerated a number of exceptions in order to guarantee the re-
election of some experienced legislators considered indispensable to the 
upcoming parliament. Among the aspirants to candidacy fielded by the PD and 
the SEL, the novices’ mean age (47 years) was considerably lower than the 
incumbents’ mean age (54); therefore, norms restraining the latter advantage 
the former. As this limitation was indirect, primary voters were completely free 
to vote for novices or incumbents at will. 
Finally, sometimes primary voters’ attitudes and preferences could be 
expressed without any constraints. This was the case of the SVP for all 
dimensions of renewal, and of the M5S for gender balance. The last example is 
exceptional. Members turning out for the M5S’s closed primaries were 
completely free to vote for male or female aspirants to candidacy. The latter 
were a tiny minority of the whole field (193, or 13 percent, compared with 
1,293 male aspirants). However, as noted in Table 7 above, women performed 
exceptionally at the primaries and therefore a large proportion entered 
parliament. The case of women’s parliamentary representation through the 
gains made by the M5S is probably a better perspective through which to 
consider an unconstrained selectorate’s attitudes towards renewal. 
Table 11 summarises how, and how much, primary rules may hinder 
selectors and eventually contribute to parliamentary renewal. It details a point 
often emphasised by scholars: as rules matter, rule-makers can use their 
privileged positions to disingenuously influence the process of candidate 
selection (Hopkin 2001; Katz 2001; Cross et al. 2016, chapter 4). This could be 
a minor problem when, as happens in the United States, primaries’ rule-makers 
are public institutions not directly involved in candidate selection. In the case of 
private primary elections, i.e. those promoted by the parties themselves, the 
rule-maker is the party leadership, which is obviously interested in the results of 
the process of selection. For instance, using concepts proposed by Katz and 
Mair (1993), the central office of a given party is advantaged when the public 
office is held accountable. From this point of view, leader appointments are 
clearly preferable to primaries. 
TAB. 11 - Primaries rules constraints on the selectors’ attitudes.
Political party Gender balance Rejuvenation Turnover 
Partito Democratico Strong Weak Strong 
Sinistra Ecologia e 
Libertà Strong Weak Strong 
Südtiroler 
Volkspartei None None None 
Movimento 5 Stelle None Weak Total 
This is because all nominations by party leaders we have examined 
here are at best cautious towards renewal, if not openly oriented towards 
preservation. This means that when acting as candidate selectors, party 
leaders may easily pursue conservation and safeguarding. By contrast, when 
party members and sympathisers are given a say, they have preferred 
renewal. The image provided by the parliament elected in the 2013 general 
elections shows that a great renewal of the political elite has occurred. This 
renewal was the result of a combination of factors. As argued above, a new 
political party’s entrance into parliament clearly boosted the number of 
newly elected legislators lacking experience at the national political level-
especially in the case of the M5S, where candidates were required to be 
novices. There were also pressures for renewal which emerged from public 
opinion and led parties to implement procedures for increasing participation 
and promoting the renewal of the political elite. Inclusive candidate 
selection methods contributed to the extent that-as it has been observed-
whereas selectors are allowed to have a say, their vote in open and closed 
primaries went in the direction of a change of the political elite in terms of 
gender balance and generational renewal. However, parties kept control of 
selection by setting the rules of the selection procedures. Candidacy 
requirements and the principles used to allocate places on closed lists 
ultimately affected the final election results. All in all, our analyses have 
clarified that even if inclusivity in candidate selection methods may 
facilitate the renewal of political elites, the role played by central party 
offices when stating the rules still has a determinant effect. Again, rules 
matter-perhaps more than primaries and participation. 
This leaves an unresolved question: is this inclination for change a 
standing attitude of all primaries’ selectorates, originating from their 
recognised political sophistication and interest in politics? Or, rather, we 
have observed idiosyncratic behaviours deriving from Italian citizens’ 
shifting opinions in a phase of populist criticism against parliament and 
legislators? This is, of course, a question we cannot answer in reference to a 
single election. As usual, more research is needed. 
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